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Since this Chair is named after Ernst van der Beugel, I 
thought it most appropriate to talk about the man himself. 
To do so I will refer to his friendship with Henry Kissinger, 
to the existence of a transnational elite within the study of 
transatlantic diplomatic history, and fi nally to an example, 
involving Van der Beugel, Kissinger, and KLM, which illustrates 
its relevance in a specifi c policy situation. To conclude, I 
highlight the need for a new diplomatic history that can merge 
the formal and informal aspects of diplomatic relations into a 
coherent whole. 
From time to time it is diffi cult to realize that you and I 
still belong to the same human species and the only thing I 
can say is that I feel very safe with you in that spot of chief 
political astronaut. 
It is very strange to feel that every thing which the US does 
and in which I always felt so terribly ‘engagé’ now has on 
top of that the second dimension of knowing that one of 
your best friends is involved to the extent you are.
Ernst van der Beugel to Henry Kissinger (Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs), 25 April 19691
Ernst van der Beugel, without whom my life would be 
unimaginable.
Henry Kissinger, The Years of Upheaval (1982)
Of professor Van der Beugel’s many international political, 
academic, and business contacts throughout his life, his close 
friendship with Henry Kissinger stands out as being quite 
exceptional. They fi rst met in 1957 when Kissinger, Associate 
Professor at Harvard and recently appointed Associate Director 
of the Center for International Affairs, was touring Europe 
following the publication of his book Nuclear Weapons and 
Foreign Policy.2 At the time Van der Beugel was the Secretary of 
State for European Cooperation in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, 
and Kissinger was introduced to the Dutchman thanks to a 
suggestion of the then US Ambassador to the Netherlands, H. 
Freeman Matthews. The fi rst meeting over lunch left a strong 
impression on both men, each intrigued and stimulated by the 
other’s political and intellectual insight. Kissinger, a German 
émigré to the United States in 1938, was always active in 
meeting and tracking rising talents on the European scene, and 
as Director of the Harvard International Seminar he would 
invite many of them to the US.3 Van der Beugel, fascinated by 
the United States since reading of the New Deal during his 
student days in the 1930s and having been directly involved in 
the implementation of the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s, was 
always keen to discuss American power, strategy, and purpose.4 
Despite the increasing intensity of their professional lives, their 
contact developed considerably over the ensuing years, as the 
opening quotes attest. Yet in the recent major biographies of 
Kissinger, fuelled by the opening of archival material from his 
time at the helm of US foreign policy, little mention is made 
of this friendship.5 Only Jeremi Suri in his Henry Kissinger and 
the American Century refers to Van der Beugel’s presence in 
Kissinger’s stellar community.6
Ernst van der Beugel and the Atlanticist Elite
It is fair to say that Ernst van der Beugel was an out-and-out 
Atlanticist. Atlanticism, of course, has come in many shades 
and colours. From the 1940s to the 1960s there were those 
who argued for the gradual building of institutions towards 
transatlantic economic and political unity on the basis of 
a common Western civilisation. Only in this way could 
transatlantic differences be diffused, divisions removed, and 
the strength for repulsing enemies gained. The shape of this 
‘unity’ differed greatly, from federalism to confederalism to 
partnership, but the wish to bind the two halves of the Atlantic 
together both formally and informally was a constant. In 
contrast, Van der Beugel belonged to a more realist stream of 
Atlanticism that wanted US leadership, based in NATO and 
extending into other policy fi elds, to provide the focal point for 
Western unity. The US security guarantee was the corner-stone 
for continuing West European stability and integrity. European 
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integration was a necessity but should not trigger false - and 
dangerous - illusions of grandeur.7 This outlook separated 
him from his oldest friend, Max Kohnstamm, who together 
with Jean Monnet felt that Europe fi rst needed to develop its 
own economic capability and political voice before it could 
contribute fully to the Atlantic cause. Kohnstamm in no way 
advocated a break with the United States, and during the 1950s 
and early 1960s he, Monnet, and their Action Committee for 
a United States of Europe were very infl uential in Washington 
policy-making circles. US policy support for European unity 
therefore placed Van der Beugel and other Dutch Atlanticists in 
the position of “plus royaliste que le roi”8 or, better said, “plus 
Atlanticist que les Américains”.9 The history and international 
position of the United States meant that it was not made for 
international cooperation between equals: Instead, as Van 
der Beugel stated in his oral history, “they can be sublime in a 
hegemonic position”. It was for these reasons that colleagues in 
the Labour party protested when he was named State Secretary 
for European affairs in 1958 because they considered him 
anti-European.10 But there was a clear divide between his pro-
US attitude and his wish to maintain a Dutch identity. More 
British in his social manner and, defi nitely, with his sense of 
humour, Van der Beugel was never keen on actually moving 
to the US to live, preferring to be “revitalised” through regular 
contact with that country.11 
But Van der Beugel was not just any Atlanticist - for several 
decades he belonged to what can only be referred to as the 
Atlanticist elite, the loose collection of policy practitioners, 
intellectuals and infl uentials dedicated to maintaining close 
transatlantic relations from dinner table to diplomacy and 
all points in between. It is worth refl ecting a little here on 
the term ‘elite’. By origin a French word, in the sixteenth 
century it initially referred to making some kind of a choice: 
faire élite. By the seventeenth century it had become attached 
to merchandise of a higher quality. It was only in the late 
eighteenth century that the term was applied to particular 
social groups, such as crack military units or the upper reaches 
of the nobility. The Oxford English Dictionary records the 
fi rst usage in the Anglo-Saxon world in 1823. The notion that 
society would best be ruled by those of superior talent or 
intellect has of course a long lineage in political thought, its 
most well-known formulation in Western thinking coming 
already in Plato’s The Republic, and there have been plenty of 
religiously-inspired creeds based around a chosen few having 
special access to a deity. However, the modern, common use of 
the term elite, with which we are all familiar (however loosely), 
only entered circulation in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, fuelled by wider speculations at the time 
on democracy, class, and race.12 
The fi rst to begin analysing what exactly an ‘elite’ might mean 
in a political context was the Italian Vilfredo Pareto, who in his 
four volume Trattato di Sociologia Generale from 1915-1919 
presented a picture of society run by an elite that could be 
divided into governing and non-governing groups. For Pareto, 
as for his fellow-country-man Gaetano Mosca, society would 
always be divided between some kind of organised minority 
and a non-elite majority. This was not necessarily at odds with 
a democratic system, which could operate as an open arena for 
competing elites organising and contesting for power, as liberal 
pluralists argued from the 1950s onwards. But what concerns 
us here is the image of two principle concentric circles of 
political importance - in the words of T.B. Bottomore, “in 
every society there is, and must be, a minority which rules over 
the rest of society; this minority [is composed of] the ‘political 
class’ or ‘governing elite’, composed of those who occupy the 
posts of political command and, more vaguely, those who can 
directly infl uence political decisions…”.13 The key part of this 
sentence is ‘more vaguely’. Neither Pareto nor Mosca offered 
a clear idea of who exactly belonged to this outer circle of 
infl uentials, partly due to the fact that both theorists opposed a 
closed determinist interpretation based on class, and partly due 
to the fact that politically, sociologically, even psychologically, 
it is not always a straight-forward matter to track lines of 
infl uence coming into the policy-making environment 
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from ‘outside’. Bottomore himself refers to a “political class” 
including “all those groups which exercise political power or 
infl uence,” within which one can isolate a “political elite” of 
“those individuals who actually exercise political power in a 
society at any given time”.14 
Following Pareto and Mosca, the analysis of political elites 
focused on their function within national political systems, 
and the special impact of particular groups within the 
elite itself. US-based positivist political science conducted 
comparative studies, such as that by Harold Lasswell and 
others at the Hoover Institute during the 1950s, investigating 
the specifi c relations between elites and the practice of political 
power in different national contexts.15 C. Wright Mills gave 
us the Power Elite, with its triumvirate of corporation heads, 
political leaders, and military chiefs.16 Antonio Gramsci 
focused on the role of intellectuals, who he saw as fulfi lling 
“an organisational function in the wide sense - whether in the 
fi eld of production, or in that of culture, or in that of political 
administration”17 - that is, they projected and maintained the 
norms of everyday politics, economics, and society according 
to particular class interests. Research on the compatibility (or 
not) of elites and democracy has produced many valuable 
studies.18 New terms have been brought into service by other 
commentators since then to refer to this social phenomenon, 
such as managers, experts, professionals, technocrats, cadres, 
and the establishment, to name a few,19 but the basis has largely 
remained the same - the role of particular groups in a national 
political context. Studies in the Netherlands have largely 
followed this pattern, examining the sources and stability of 
elites and their infl uence in the political, foreign policy, and 
economic-fi nancial realms.20
Let us return to Ernst van der Beugel. For just over a decade, 
from the late 1940s to the late 1950s, he certainly belonged 
to what Bottomore would refer to as the decision-making 
political elite in the Netherlands. From 1945 to 1952 he was 
directly involved in the planning and implementation of 
post-war economic recovery, particularly in coordination 
with the European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan. He 
then switched from the Ministry of Economics to Foreign 
Affairs, at fi rst continuing his role in coordinating the US-
sponsored economic and military assistance programme, 
before becoming the State Secretary for European Affairs 
during 1957-58. The signifi cance of this period in terms of 
Van der Beugel’s career as a whole is very clear, both politically 
and administratively, and his offi cial role in a national, 
European, and transatlantic setting. From the perspective 
of traditional, archive-based diplomatic history it is also a 
relatively straightforward task to track and assess this period, 
in the sense of following the paper trail that records his 
decision-making, the processes that led to it and the results 
that fed from it, and his deliberations and negotiations with 
policy-making counterparts. Van der Beugel’s contribution to 
implementing the Marshall Plan and furthering the cause of 
European integration is therefore ‘safe’, to put it prosaically, 
in the hands of the diplomatic historian interested in the 
workings of government and the direction of policy. But 
then we approach a conundrum. As of 22 December 1958 
Van der Beugel left his position as State Secretary when the 
cabinet of Labour leader Willem Drees handed in its collective 
resignation. During early 1959, to bridge the period of new 
elections and the formation of a new cabinet, Van der Beugel 
continued as an advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
but on 1 July 1959 his offi cial connection with the Dutch 
government ended, and he was thereafter - aside from the 
possibility of becoming Mayor of Rotterdam in 1964-65, which 
he turned down - never tempted to return. For a traditional 
diplomatic historian, at that point he effectively falls off the 
map. A fi ne synopsis of Van der Beugel’s career, published in 
2008 in a collection of essays on Dutch diplomats and civil 
servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, illustrates the 
problem. The focus lies on his administrative career, while the 
period thereafter is sketched as a series of anecdotes because 
it doesn’t fi t easily into a chronicle on diplomats. This is not 
an issue of quality - it is after all a fi ne contribution - but an 
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observation on the limitations of this kind of history-writing. 
As the author says, “Van der Beugel was a born networker,” 
not so much for his own benefi t but above all as a middle-
man bringing others together, such as the Dutch football 
term ‘aangever’ suggests.21 Yet his networking occurred largely 
outside of the formal diplomatic arena. A full appreciation of 
Ernst van der Beugel’s life and work clearly needs to fi nd a way 
to tap into and unwrap these extra dimensions and place them 
in a political context that understands their signifi cance.
Even a cursory glance at his career confi rms this. From 1959 
to 1963 he was at the centre of national economic interests in 
heading one of the foremost multinational concerns, Royal 
Dutch Airlines. His departure from KLM represented another 
turning point - having already decided that front-line politics 
was not for him, he likewise saw that a full-time business 
position was not the way ahead. Instead he sought out, 
successfully, a more free-form existence. From 1966 to 1983 
he was very infl uential as Professor of Western Cooperation 
after World War II here in Leiden, a host of future members of 
the Dutch diplomatic corps passing through his classes. Only 
recently did the former Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer, discussing his appointment to the Kooijmans 
Chair in Leiden, remark that professor Van der Beugel was 
a major infl uence on his political thinking as a student: ‘Bij 
hem ben ik afgestudeerd op een scriptie over de Amerikaanse 
militaire aanwezigheid in Europa. Hij is iemand die mij sterk 
heeft gemotiveerd voor vredes- en veiligheidsbeleid’.22 Van 
der Beugel’s page on the website of Parlement en Politiek, 
a database of Dutch political history, lists forty-eight board 
memberships and advisory posts, spanning the 1950s to the 
1980s and covering everything from business, academia, and 
health to cultural exchange, economic planning, and security 
think tanks.23 Above all, he served at the centre of two of the 
most important institutions in the transatlantic milieu: from 
1960 to 1980 he served as the European Secretary General for 
the Bilderberg meetings, and from 1972-85 the chairperson 
of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. 
While the IISS deserves more attention, Bilderberg is always a 
nice subject, and those of you familiar with my work will know 
that it would have been impossible for me to give this speech 
without going into it in some way. It also gives us a perfect 
entrée back to the issue of elites and diplomatic history.
The fi rst Bilderberg meeting took place in the Hotel 
Bilderberg in Oosterbeek, near Arnhem, in May 1954, and 
there have been annual meetings at locations on both sides 
of the Atlantic ever since. The brainchild of the Pole Joseph 
Retinger to provide a forum for off-the-record discussion 
between American and European infl uentials, ease policy 
differences, and dispel misunderstandings, the proposal 
rapidly took on a strong Dutch fl avour with the invitation 
to Prince Bernhard to become the group’s chairman. The 
annual informal gatherings were meant to involve a circulating 
group of participants from policy-making, media, business 
and academia, brought together to discuss current issues 
and problems in transatlantic (and global) affairs. In 1959 
Van der Beugel, who already knew the Prince through his 
government work, came into more regular contact with him 
through their common association with KLM. It was this 
that led to the Prince asking him to be Retinger’s successor 
as Secretary General, and he attended his fi rst Bilderberg 
meeting in Turkey later that same year to assume this new 
role.24 Van der Beugel was candid in his appreciation of what 
this position meant for him: “Als ik kijk naar mijn leven na 
Buitenlandse Zaken en KLM, dan is die Bilderberg voor mij 
ongeloofl ijk belangrijk geweest”.25 He states openly that it 
not only provided a second-to-none source for his research 
on transatlantic relations (and several generations of Leiden 
students were educated with priceless Bilderberg anecdotes), 
but it also opened doors for the expansion of his own activities 
into the board-rooms of Rank Xerox, Petrofi na, and General 
Electric, among others. His capabilities as a deferential but 
determined manager and supervisor of the transatlantic 
relationship confi rmed, it led directly to his appointment as 
council member and then chairman (for twelve years) of the 
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equally prestigious and infl uential International Institute of 
Strategic Studies in London. On Bilderberg as a whole he was 
adamant that it was this provision of access as a meeting point 
(not a network “maar het komt er wel bij”), rather than any 
exertion of political infl uence from behind the scenes, which 
gave it its special value.26 Nevertheless, the facilitation of 
informal understanding between transatlantic power-brokers 
is something that deserves attention, because it must have fed 
through into policy-arenas, media outlets, and lecture halls. 
How has Bilderberg been treated by diplomatic history? The 
short answer is not very well. There are quite a few books, 
ranging from the poor to the dreadful, which sensationalise its 
importance as some kind of shadow world government taking 
decisions that affect our lives and that never gain democratic 
consent.27 However, there is a new generation of scholars who 
are piecing together the relevance of Bilderberg based on the 
careful analysis of a broad range of archival sources, in doing 
so de-mystifying it and bringing it within range of diplomatic 
historical legitimacy and respectability: Valerie Aubourg 
in France, Thomas Gijswijt in the Netherlands, Ingeborg 
Philipsen in Denmark, and Hugh Wilford in the United States 
are particularly important here.28 What needs to be grasped 
with Bilderberg is its essential transnational character - its 
participants, roving from one location to another within the 
Atlantic world to discuss a shifting agenda of topics depending 
on contemporary developments, were effectively forming a 
novel informal community of infl uence, a kind of transatlantic 
political space, that knew no national boundaries. I turn here 
to Hugh Wilford’s conclusions concerning his research on 
Bilderberg:
One thing that the new documentary evidence does show 
clearly is that it is extremely diffi cult to locate Bilderberg’s 
origins in terms of national history. The Group was 
neither an entirely European nor American invention, but 
rather the result of a highly complex process of Atlantic 
interaction. For that matter, it is equally diffi cult to tell 
whether Bilderberg was the creation of state agencies, 
specifi cally the western intelligence services, or non-
governmental actors. In the curious person of its principal 
founder, the wandering scholar Retinger, the distinction 
between the private and offi cial realms, civil society and 
the state, seem to collapse altogether, as indeed does the 
very concept of nationality.29 
The notion of the transnational as opposed to the national or 
international has certainly gathered attention within the fi eld 
of International Relations, such as to do with the importance 
of multinational corporations and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). On the infl uence of transnational 
elites in the Atlantic area, there has been the ground-breaking 
work of Caroll Quigley and his memorable if impenetrable 
Tragedy and Hope (1962),30 but the best analyses have come 
from Gramscian-inspired studies such as the work of Robert 
Cox and Stephen Gill in Toronto, and those associated with 
the former Amsterdam School, particularly Kees van der Pijl.31 
Constructivists have also turned their attention to the role 
of elites in the diffusion of ideas and their transformation 
into norms, guiding behaviour as a result. Yet it is not simply 
outside observers from the academic community who have 
absorbed the signifi cance of transnational elites. James 
Huntley, a foremost believer in transatlantic unity and active 
both inside and outside the US government in promoting 
it since WW II, has recorded how his introduction to the 
work of Gaetano Mosca whilst a student at Harvard opened 
his eyes to the crucial role a multinational elite could play in 
amalgamating societies across national boundaries, thereby 
increasing the chances for peace.32 And Ernst van der Beugel 
himself openly recognised the infl uence of transnational 
non-state groups. In his inaugural lecture as professor in 
Leiden on 9 December 1966 he spoke of the “particularly 
great signifi cance” of Jean Monnet’s Action Committee for a 
United States of Europe during the 1950s and early 1960s, and 
in his afscheidscollege here on 16 November 1984 he pointed 
in the same direction when he remarked that the main threat 
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to continuing Western cooperation was a growing tendency 
towards a shallow materialist nationalism, the implication 
being that this could only be overcome through the continual 
fostering of a political consciousness not bound by national 
borders.33 These references are all the more striking since 
Van der Beugel generally wrote from a traditional diplomatic 
history perspective, treating nation-states as separate units that 
hold the keys to all decision-making powers. 
Ernst van der Beugel, Henry Kissinger, and KLM
It is time to return to the contact between Van der Beugel and 
Henry Kissinger, and to introduce the issue of KLM. When 
these two men fi rst met in 1957, KLM was at the top of Van 
der Beugel’s agenda. Since the end of World War II the Dutch 
airline had been seeking to expand its landing rights in the 
United States in order to increase its lucrative transatlantic 
operations, but the issue had become an awkward bone of 
contention between the two nations. US airlines (especially 
PanAm) had a lot of political muscle and they disliked the 
serious competition they faced from the Dutch. As State 
Secretary, Van der Beugel was directly involved in the tough 
negotiations that led to KLM fl ights being allowed into 
Houston, an agreement that temporarily solved the issue.34 
But the discontent on the Dutch side rumbled on, and Foreign 
Minister Luns raised the issue with the Americans at every 
opportunity. In the hierarchy of national interest, KLM was 
placed only slightly below the monarchy.
Through Van der Beugel, Kissinger gradually became drawn 
into the world of KLM. As company president in the early 
1960s the Dutchman organised a large-scale annual dinner 
for the great and the good in the Netherlands, and for three 
years running Kissinger was the guest speaker, fl ying over the 
Atlantic on the Dutch carrier, all expenses paid. There is no 
doubt that, through these visits, Kissinger became acquainted 
with the signifi cance of KLM within Dutch-American 
relations. In May 1961, during a European tour, he took on 
the role of minor go-between when he privately expressed 
to McGeorge Bundy in the White House the level of Dutch 
agitation on the issue, going so far as to forward a letter from 
Van der Beugel that made this plain. Kissinger expressed no 
feelings on the issue at that time.35 The contact between the 
two men continued to develop. Van der Beugel, at Kissinger’s 
suggestion, stayed at Harvard for several months in 1963 
to work on his dissertation.36 He would return to Harvard 
in 1967 to deliver a series of Erasmus lectures, and, had the 
negotiations gone according to plan, he would certainly have 
occupied a proposed Lectureship in the Civilisation of the 
Netherlands at Harvard which unfortunately, due to reasons 
not important here, never materialised.37 Whenever the 
American came to Europe, the Dutchman personally secured 
the best assistance for his travels via the appropriate KLM 
offi ces.38 When Kissinger’s parents visited the Netherlands 
in August 1966, they fl ew KLM and were hosted by Van der 
Beugel.39 And of course they met at the Bilderberg meetings, 
Kissinger being a regular participant after fi rst attending in 
1957 - something that his biographers have also largely passed 
over.40
By the mid-60s, the Dutch were focusing on gaining landing 
rights in Chicago. The real aim was Los Angeles, but the 
level of American opposition to this meant that the mid-
west option was more realistic. The election of Richard 
Nixon in 1968 seemed to open an opportunity - the new US 
Ambassador to the Netherlands, J. William Middendorf II, 
had been the treasurer to the Republican National Committee 
and a campaign advisor for Nixon, giving him quite some 
infl uence in the Oval Offi ce. Middendorf has gone on record 
in an oral history interview that his direct personal contact 
with the President enabled him to secure KLM landing rights 
at Chicago O’Hare airport before he even arrived in The Hague 
in mid-1969.41 However, the truth seems somewhat different. 
In March 1969 President Nixon made his fi rst trip to Europe, 
but failed to include the Netherlands in his itinerary. Seeing 
this as a slight for a close and loyal ally, this drew a “vociferous” 
reaction from Foreign Minister Luns.42 Washington tried 
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to make amends by inviting Luns and Prime Minister Piet 
de Jong to come to the White House in late May, the fi rst 
European leaders to meet Nixon there, but this was alone not 
enough - the message from The Hague was that the Dutchmen 
must return home after the meeting with some form of 
concrete policy concession. It was necessary for the US to 
publicly show its support for the Dutch government at a time 
when domestic politics, fuelled by opposition to the Vietnam 
war, was becoming restive.
The outlook for the May meeting was initially not good. When 
Kissinger, now National Security Advisor, informed Nixon of 
a visit by Prince Bernhard on 19 April, he raised the possibility 
that Bernhard, as a member of the KLM board, may raise the 
landing rights issue “which in all likelihood we will have to 
refuse”.43 Then late in the day the issue loosened up. On 20 
May Helmut Sonnenfeldt reported to Kissinger that the State 
Department, although divided internally, now recommended 
laying “the groundwork for a satisfactory negotiated outcome”. 
The Chicago route was calculated to be worth $7.5m annually 
for KLM, but if the Dutch conceded on some other minor 
points then they could come close to a reciprocal agreement.44 
By 23 May Nixon was being advised that, considering long-
standing support for US objectives on Vietnam, nuclear 
proliferation, and trade and monetary policy, the visit of 
Luns and De Jong “should build renewed Dutch confi dence 
in the United States”.45 The fi rst meeting between the leaders 
on 27 May followed this pattern, and that same afternoon 
Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson, De Jong, and Luns 
confi rmed “that there was agreement in principle” to settle 
the request for landing rights in Chicago, with the “technical 
details” to be negotiated in Washington in July.46 It was, by all 
intents and purposes, a remarkably swift breakthrough. 
 
Why refer to this episode at all? In his oral history interview 
Van der Beugel is asked by Rob Meines if he ever used his close 
friendship with Kissinger to gain any results on policy matters. 
He answered no, not at all….well, yes. Once. To do with 
KLM and the Chicago negotiations. Literally: “De KLM heeft 
Chicago gekregen omdat ik dat via Henry heb gedaan”. Meines 
tries to delve a little deeper - Who proposed this contact? But 
Van der Beugel is vague - it may have been someone from 
KLM, or possibly the government….and he then changes the 
subject.47 Yet the documentary record fi ts this fl eeting image of 
a backroom deal based on a transatlantic friendship. Following 
the Luns-De Jong visit to Nixon in May 1969 Van der Beugel 
wrote to Kissinger the following:
I can hardly tell you how excellently everything has 
worked. It has been a repair job of the highest order and 
the impact on American-Dutch relations could not be 
better. It will please you to know that both of them [Luns 
and De Jong] fully realized how very important the role 
has been which you have played in the arrangement and 
the substance of the visit. I repeat, it could not have been 
better.48
Kissinger seems to have been able to shift the way in which 
the issue would be treated. In early March 1969 it was being 
reported that President Nixon was “supporting stronger 
State Department direction of international air transport 
activities….to permit a tighter application of foreign policy 
considerations”. In practice this meant that, if necessary, the 
President would intervene directly in the decision-making 
process.49 Who else would have argued for this aside from the 
President’s own National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger? 
Having laid the groundwork for a favourable treatment of the 
Dutch request in the Oval Offi ce, Kissinger stayed on top of 
the KLM negotiations from start to fi nish. In early July 1969 
Peter Flanigan, Assistant to the President for International 
Economic Affairs, came to the Netherlands for preparatory 
talks on the Chicago deal. Ernst van der Beugel, the informal 
link-man, made enquiries with “a close friend,” Secretary of 
State for Transportation Meijer Keyzer, to ensure that there 
were no remaining obstacles, something which Kissinger 
greatly appreciated.50 Talks conducted between 14-18 July duly 
reached an agreement that KLM would receive the right for 
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non-stop fl ights between Amsterdam and Chicago. Kissinger 
had made clear to the State Department beforehand that 
he “would especially appreciate being informed should the 
negotiations run into diffi culty”.51 Soon afterwards Flanigan, 
clearly on the instigation of Kissinger, convened an inter-
agency committee to review US aviation policy and contacted 
Van der Beugel for his advice on the matter.52 
What secured a deal on Chicago? Middendorf ’s intervention 
was certainly not as decisive as he would like to imagine, 
although his special access to the President may have had 
some impact.53 The State Department’s advice to Nixon to take 
the opportunity to quell a major irritant in Dutch-American 
relations probably had more weight. The negotiations were 
complicated by extra issues, involving the rights of US charter 
airlines and KLM’s Caribbean subsidiary, which delayed a fi nal 
agreement until November 1969. Needless to say, the offi cial 
record has no trace that Kissinger was involved.54 But there is 
no doubt that the Kissinger - Van der Beugel relation was a 
constant factor in the background. Flanigan informed Van der 
Beugel of the following: 
long before Kissinger had accepted his position in the 
White House, he had been continuously reminded by 
[you] that US aviation policy created diffi culties with other 
countries, which were unjustifi able if one considered these 
interests in the context of relations with these countries as 
a whole.55 
Kissinger’s foremost concern, as Van der Beugel rightly stated 
in his oral history, was stability in international politics. 
For this reason he would have understood the necessity to 
remove an irritating issue that was undermining the otherwise 
close relations between two allies. By bringing civil aviation 
negotiations within the bounds of national security, he 
could exercise greater control over the process. Of course, he 
wouldn’t have done this purely for the Netherlands. But it 
is hard to believe that he would have invested such concern 
in the KLM issue as National Security Advisor without his 
friendship with Van der Beugel. The Kissinger - Van der Beugel 
connection set the context within which a successful agreement 
could be reached, and this alone is signifi cant. The traces of 
the transnational elite’s informal networks are therefore to 
be found in traditional diplomacy and policy-making, but 
they are not always immediately apparent. The task of a ‘new’ 
diplomatic history, therefore, is exactly to identify these traces 
and build up a broader, multi-layered picture of diplomatic 
relations that refl ects both the complexity of formal and 
informal transnational contacts, and their impact, in the 
transatlantic area. Only in this way can a full appreciation of 
Ernst van der Beugel’s infl uence be secured.
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